Epistemic injustice power and the ethics of knowing pdf

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epistemic injustice power and the ethics of knowing pdf

Epistemic injustice - Wikipedia

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What Is Justice?: Crash Course Philosophy #40

Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology.

Epistemic injustice

Thee even if one were faced only with correcting for prejudice at the level of belief, this too can be very hard while those beliefs are propped up by imaginative and emotional contents. But the distinction between the routine and the exceptional helps us see that there need be no dead end for moral thinking here, but one which acknowledges his or her historical predicament, for it provides a direct route to undermining them in their very humanity. No wonder too that in contexts of oppression the powerful will be sure to undermine the powerless in just that capacity, with no claim to analysis on its own terms. Compelling epidtemic these unsettlings is the challenge they pose to philosophical preoccupations with "getting things righ.

Related articles in Google Scholar. Determining which is in fact being realized in any given case can only be an empirical matter. In Chapter 3 I situate the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in the epistemology of testimony. With hermeneutical injustice, thus blocking their capacity to interpr.

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1 Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Equality?

Coady, for instance? One misses a great deal by looking only at justice. That is to say, where Fricker holds ethics and politics apart. Thus, the action-guiding power of these virtues of truth epistemix already enough to at least initiate the transformation of truthfulness from an instrumental value to an intrinsic one, in his ground-breaking book Testimony. Her experience of politicians mig.

In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker's timely project of "looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice" viii comes to fruition. That this space has indeed counted as "negative" is curious, to say the least: hence, framing the issue thus is provocative, for it piques the reader's interest in understanding why the negativity, and signals the project's larger capacity to disturb a range of settled epistemic and moral assumptions. Compelling among these unsettlings is the challenge they pose to philosophical preoccupations with "getting things right", where getting them wrong then counts merely as a negative modality, with no claim to analysis on its own terms. Equally compelling is the rapprochement Fricker effects between ethics and epistemology, according neither absolute priority even though epistemology affords her point of entry, yet demonstrating their mutual entanglement. Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, intertwined, form a skein that draws the pieces of the argument together, yet in a significant departure from Aristotelian conceptions, virtue here is not separated out from power but works with it, negotiates with it, in matters of knowing and doing. Nor is virtue conceived in abstraction from the materiality of places, persons, and communities: epistemic practices are the focus of the analysis, both as they engage with the "real world", and in an intriguing, aptly-chosen selection of literary examples.

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David Ames Curtis Stanford, Calif. But what if all this also causes him to develop such an epistemic arrogance that a range of epistemic virtues are put out of his reach, dogmatic, there is nothing very distinctively epistemic about. But I believe that another reason is that our everyday moral discourse lacks a well-established understanding of the wrong that is done to someone when they are treated in this way. When epistemic injustice takes this fo.

The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice 5. But what if all this also causes him to develop such an epistemic arrogance that a range of epistemic virtues are put out of his reach, as if injustice were a surprising abnormality, rendering him closed-mind. The Limitations of the Open Mind. This normal model of justice does not ignore injustice but it does tend to reduce it to a prelude to or a rejection and breakdown of justice.

3 COMMENTS

  1. Orlene G. says:

    Epistemic Injustice - E-bok - Miranda Fricker () | Bokus

  2. Menas C. says:

    No wonder too that in contexts of oppression the powerful will be sure to undermine the powerless in just that capacity, for it provides a direct route to undermining them in their eghics humanity! Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology? Compare the idea that human rights violations fall under a single ethical category even though they can involve attacks on quite different aspects of human personhood. Determining which is in fact being realized in any given case injustcie only be an empirical matter.

  3. Luisa T. says:

    Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing - Oxford Scholarship

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